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Graph states are a large class of multipartite entangled quantum states that form the basis
of schemes for quantum computation, communication, error correction, metrology, and more. In
this work, we consider verification of graph states generated by an untrusted source and shared
between a network of possibly dishonest parties. This has implications in certifying the application
of graph states for various distributed tasks. We first provide a general protocol and analysis for
the verification of any graph state in such a network, and then adapt it to reduce the resources
required for specific examples such as cluster states, complete and cycle graph states. In each case,
we demonstrate how parties in the network can efficiently test and assess the closeness of their
shared state to the desired graph state, even in the presence of any number of dishonest parties.
The usefulness of graph states extends across
the field of quantum information, with their inher-
ent multipartite entanglement leading them to be
promising candidates for a variety of tasks. As quan-
tum states that correspond to mathematical graphs,
where vertices represent qubits and edges prepara-
tion entanglement, graph states may possess varied
entanglement that render them ideal for applications
ranging from quantum computation [1–3] and error
correction [4, 5] to cryptography [6, 7], metrology [8–
10] and much more [11–13].
As such, the verification of these resource states is
a natural question, and has been the topic of much in-
vestigation, under different assumptions of trust and
questions of interest [14]. For example, in tomogra-
phy, one wishes to find the density matrix of the state,
whilst trusting measuring devices and that the state
is not correlated across preparations, i.e. that it is
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) [15].
With entanglement witnesses, on the other hand, we
have the same trust settings but are interested only in
demonstrating entanglement [16]. In cryptographic
settings, one is often interested in the case where
measurement devices are trusted, but the sources of
the states are not, and in fact not even that they
are i.i.d. [17–21]. Going further, in self-testing and
device-independent approaches, one does not trust
the source or the measurement devices [22]. These
techniques have had applications across quantum in-
formation for verification of delegated quantum com-
putation [17–20], simulation [23], sampling and net-
work tasks [17, 24].
In all these examples, however, all of the partic-
ipating parties behave in an honest way; it is the
source or their devices which are not trusted. One
may also be interested in a stronger type of scenario,
where a graph state is distributed over a network of
parties each holding a share of the state, but where,
crucially, not all the parties behave in an honest way.
This is an important cryptographic scenario, which
has applications, for example, in the task of secure
multiparty quantum computation [25, 26], involving
a set of possibly dishonest parties who wish to com-
pute some function of their inputs. The first efforts to
verify states in this scenario was for GHZ states [27–
29]. This has already found application, for example,
in anonymous transmission of quantum messages [7].
The ubiquity of graph states for quantum information
naturally suggests the interest in generalising such an
approach to all graph states.
In this work, we present a way of verifying graph
states across a network with untrusted parties. Our
results come at two levels. For the fully general case,
our protocol requires a number of copies of the graph
state which grows exponentially with the size of the
graph state. This requirement can be drastically re-
duced when more structure is available, in particular
when the graph has certain symmetries, and/or one
can make assumptions about the clustering of dishon-
est parties. We present families of examples which
require only a linear number of copies, and include
many graph states of interest, such as the complete
graph state (locally equivalent to the GHZ state),
one- and two-dimensional cluster states, graph states
for secret sharing and cyclic graph states. For ease
of presentation, we break our work down into two
protocols. The first follows very similarly to [20], ex-
tending its use to dishonest networks, but requires
an assumption on one party (the Verifier) to act hon-
estly. The second protocol builds on this and is more
involved, but removes this assumption. In this way,
all parties are equally treated with no assumptions
on their honest behaviour, and we refer to this as the
symmetric protocol.
Communication scenario.— Our network consists
of n parties, split into sets of honest and dishonest
parties, which we will denote by H and D, respec-
tively. An untrusted source is asked to produce the
n-qubit graph states requested by the parties, and
can provide any state in each round. The parties are
only required to apply local operations and measure-
ments. While the honest parties follow the protocol,
the dishonest parties might not, and can work to-
gether and do anything to their part of the state,
as well as collaborate with the source to disrupt the
protocol. Note that the honest parties do not need
to know the identity of other honest parties, whereas
the dishonest parties are assumed to have all the in-
formation about who is honest and dishonest. Each
pair of parties must share a private classical channel.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
13
12
6v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
26
 Ju
l 2
02
0
2For the symmetric version of the protocol, we also
require a trusted common random source.
Protocol.— Before we begin, let us give a brief de-
scription of stabilisers. The n-qubit graph state |G〉
associated to a graph G can be uniquely specified by
its stabiliser group S. This group is comprised of
tensor products of Pauli operators, known as sta-
bilisers Sj , where j ∈ {1, ..., 2n}, such that |G〉 is
the unique +1 eigenstate of every stabiliser Sj . The
full stabiliser group S is generated by the stabiliser
generators of each qubit i ∈ {1, ..., n}, denoted by
Ki = Xi
∏
e∈N(i) Ze, where N(i) is the set of neigh-
bouring vertices to i in the graph.
An intuitive way to test a particular graph state
is then to check that all stabiliser measurements give
an overall +1 outcome. If all parties are honest, this
can only happen if the source has sent them the ideal
graph state. Further, by asking for many copies and
randomly choosing which stabiliser to measure after
the source has sent each copy, the parties can pre-
vent the source from creating some other state that
would pass an individual stabiliser measurement but
not the full set. In fact, this is the essential idea
behind many of the verification protocols for graph
states, with details differing depending on trust, se-
curity statements and efficiency [17–21, 30]. Here, we
extend this approach to account for any number of
dishonest parties, who may work together and coor-
dinate with the dishonest source.
To achieve this goal, we will use and adapt the ver-
ification protocol from [20]. In Protocol 1, we tailor
their protocol to our scenario, where an untrusted
source distributes an arbitrary graph state amongst
a network of (possibly dishonest) parties. This is al-
most identical to that of [20] (although the security
proof requires completely new elements at the state
level to deal with dishonest parties). However, it still
requires one party, the Verifier, to behave honestly.
We then adapt it to build a new protocol to deal with
the possibility of dishonest Verifiers, which we call
the symmetric scenario (i.e. all parties are treated
equally), in Protocol 2. As in [27], this is achieved
by the use of an additional trusted common random
source.
The presence of dishonest parties affects the effi-
ciency of the protocol. While the protocol in [20]
only requires measuring the stabiliser generators of
the graph state that the parties wish to verify, in or-
der to extend this to any graph state with any num-
ber of dishonest parties, we will see that the parties
must measure the full set of stabilisers, which leads
to the requirement of exponentially many copies with
graph size. This scaling is due to the power of our
adversarial model, meaning that more copies are re-
quired for the same level of security. We will show
afterwards how to reduce this requirement if we have
more information about the dishonest parties, or for
specific graph states.
Security analysis.— We first consider the case of
an arbitrary n-qubit graph state, denoted by |G〉, and
assume an honest Verifier. The parties perform Pro-
Protocol 1 Verification of graph state
Input : The parties choose values of Ntest, Ntotal.
Let S be the set of test measurements, and J = |S|.
1: An untrusted source generatesNtotal copies of the
graph state, and sends the shares to the parties.
2: The parties repeat the following for j = 1, ..., J:
(a) The Verifier chooses Ntest copies from the
remaining Ntotal− (j− 1)Ntest copies inde-
pendently and uniformly at random.
(b) For each copy, the Verifier instructs each
party to perform the measurement corre-
sponding to their part of the stabiliser Sj .
(c) For each copy, the parties send their mea-
surement outcome to the Verifier, who cal-
culates the total measurement outcome.
The copy passes the test if the total mea-
surement outcome is +1. Let Npass,j be
the number of copies that pass the stabiliser
test for Sj .
3: The Verifier uniformly randomly chooses a sin-
gle copy from the remaining N ≡ Ntotal − JNtest
copies that were not used for the tests in the pre-
vious steps. The chosen single copy is called the
target copy. The others are discarded.
4: If Npass ≡
∑J
j=1Npass,j ≥ JNtest − Ntest2J , the
parties use the target copy for their application;
otherwise, the target copy is discarded.
tocol 1, measuring the full set of J = 2n stabilisers
(which means that the set of test measurements, S, is
the full stabiliser group S), to test whether the state
they receive in each round, |Ψ〉, is the ideal graph
state |G〉, even in the presence of dishonest parties.
In a network with dishonest parties who may col-
laborate with the source of the state, we may take
the state |Ψ〉 to be pure, as the dishonest parties can
purify it by adding a reference system. Further, in
such a network, we can only make statements on the
fidelity up to local operations on the dishonest part.
By Uhlmann’s Theorem [31], this refers to the fidelity
between the reduced states of the honest parties.
Let us then take ρ
|G〉
H to be the reduced state of the
honest parties in the ideal case (i.e. when they share
|G〉), and ρavgH to be the reduced state of the honest
parties of the averaged state of the target copy (over
all random selections from the remaining N copies).
We prove the security of our protocol in the following
Theorem for the case of an honest Verifier.
Theorem 1. Assuming an honest Verifier, if we set
Ntotal = 2× 2nNtest, Ntest = dm24n ln 2ne, and S as
the full set of stabilisers, the probability that the fi-
delity of the averaged state of the target copy (over all
possible choices of the tested copies and target copy)
3in Protocol 1 satisfies
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) ≥ 1−
2
√
c
2n
− 2× 2n
(
1− Npass
2nNtest
)
(1)
is at least 1− (2n)1− 2cm3 , where m, c are positive con-
stants chosen such that 32m < c <
(2n−1)2
4 .
Proof sketch. Our proof has three main stages. In
the first stage, we show that if all stabiliser tests pass
perfectly, the state in each round of the protocol must
be |Ψ〉 = UD |G〉, where UD is a unitary on the dis-
honest part of the state. This is the main part of
our proof. To do this, we demonstrate that, for the
Schmidt decomposition of the state corresponding to
the partition (H,D), the Schmidt basis of the honest
parties is the same for the actual and ideal states. We
illustrate this by writing the unknown actual state as
|Ψ〉 =
∑
z
αz |z〉H ⊗ |ψz〉D , (2)
|Ψ〉 =
∑
x
βx
∣∣H(x)〉H ⊗ |φx〉D , (3)
where z,x are classical |H|-bit strings, αz, βx are un-
known complex coefficients, and {|z〉}, {∣∣H(x)〉} form
complete bases for the honest side, where
∣∣H(x)〉 is
the state corresponding to the honest subgraph with
σZs applied on vertices according to x (that is, σZ
applied to the qubit of party i iff xi = 1), and
|ψz〉 , |φx〉 are the corresponding states on the dis-
honest side. We identify, purely from the fact that
all stabiliser generator tests pass perfectly, which el-
ements in {|ψz〉} and {|φx〉} are orthogonal to each
other. Passing the full set of stabiliser tests allows
us to see which βx must be zero; this tells us which
terms of |z〉 must correspond to the same αz, |ψz〉.
We then show that each unique αz = ± 1√
2|H|
. Sub-
stituting this information in Equation (2), we see that
the honest Schmidt basis of |Ψ〉 must be equal to the
honest Schmidt basis of |G〉. Thus, the only state |Ψ〉
that can pass every stabiliser test perfectly is such
that ρ
|Ψ〉
H = ρ
|G〉
H (or equivalently, |Ψ〉 = UD |G〉).
In the second stage, we employ the Serfling bound
to find that, after the 2n test measurements, the frac-
tion of states out of the remaining untested copies
that would pass all tests perfectly is at least 1 −
2
√
c
2n − 2 × 2n
(
1 − Npass2nNtest
)
, with probability at least
1 − (2n)1− 2cm3 . This follows straightforwardly using
the method of [20], but with 2n test measurements
corresponding to the full set of stabilisers.
In the final stage, we translate this statement to
the reduced state of the honest parties of the target
copy, which gives our final result.
The full proof is given in Appendix I.
Efficient examples.— For certain graph states or
sets of dishonest parties, we can reduce the resources
required for verification; in fact, we see that simply
by measuring the stabiliser generators, the desired
statement can be made about the fidelity of the un-
known state. Essentially, this can be done if, by only
the stabiliser generator tests passing perfectly, we can
make the same conclusions as from the full stabiliser
group regarding which βxs must be zero. In such a
scenario, the parties can instead run Protocol 1 with
a simplified set of test measurements (where J = n).
Let us now give some examples where such a simpli-
fication applies, as shown in the following Theorem.
The graph states we consider are of the structures
shown in Figure 1.
Theorem 2. If |G〉 is either
A. a complete graph state with dishonest parties
anywhere in the network, or
B. a pentagon graph state with either one, three or
four dishonest parties anywhere in the network,
or two dishonest parties who are adjacent, or
C. a cycle graph state with either one, n−2 or n−1
dishonest parties anywhere in the network, or
any other number of dishonest parties who are
adjacent, or
D. a 1D cluster state with either one or n− 1 dis-
honest parties anywhere in the network, or any
other number of adjacent honest or dishonest
parties, or
E. a 2D cluster state with either one or n − 1
dishonest parties anywhere in the network, or
any other set of adjacent dishonest parties that
forms a square or rectangle anywhere in the net-
work,
and we set Ntotal = 2nNtest, Ntest = dmn4 lnne,
and S as the set of stabiliser generators, assuming
an honest Verifier, the probability that the fidelity of
the averaged state of the target copy (over all possi-
ble choices of the tested copies and target copy) in
Protocol 1 satisfies
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) ≥ 1−
2
√
c
n
− 2n
(
1− Npass
nNtest
)
(4)
is at least 1 − n1− 2cm3 , where m, c are positive con-
stants chosen such that 32m < c <
(n−1)2
4 .
Proof sketch. First, we explicitly show, for the afore-
mentioned examples, that purely the stabiliser gen-
erator tests passing perfectly allows us to identify the
terms that are zero in Equation (3). Then, we follow
the remainder of the proof of Theorem 1, but with n
test measurements, and extend our results to the tar-
get copy in the final step. The full details are given
in Appendix II.
Symmetric protocol.— Up to now, we have as-
sumed that the party acting as the Verifier is honest.
We will now remove this assumption. To do so, we
4(a) (b) (c)
(d)
(e)
FIG. 1: Examples of a (a) complete graph, (b) pentagon graph, (c) cycle graph, (d) 1D cluster state, and (e) 2D cluster
state. For quantum states that correspond to these types of graphs, one can perform efficient verification using Protocol
1, possibly with some information regarding the dishonest parties, as shown in Theorem 2.
increase the number of tested copies from Ntest tests
per stabiliser to λNtest, and make use of a trusted
common random source (CRS) that provides the par-
ties with shared randomness (following [27]). The
CRS is used to replace the Verifier’s choices and to
pick which party acts as the Verifier. In this way,
the honest parties are protected against a dishonest
Verifier who may attempt to cheat. Such a symmet-
ric protocol is given in Protocol 2, with the following
adapted Theorem, whose proof is given in Appendix
III.
Theorem 3. If we set Ntotal = (λ + 1)λJNtest and
Ntest = dmJ4 ln Je, the probability that the fidelity of
the averaged state of the target copy (over all possi-
ble choices of the tested copies and target copy) in
Protocol 2 satisfies
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) ≥1−
( 1
λ
− 1
λ2
)
−
(
1 +
1
λ
)[√c
J
+ λJ− Npass
Ntest
]
(5)
is at least
[
1 − ∑λx=0 (1 − |H|n )x( |H|n J− 2cm3 )λ−x]J,
where m, c are positive constants chosen such that the
fidelity and probability expressions are greater than
zero.
Replacing J by J = 2n for a general graph state,
and J = n for the special cases in Theorem 2, we
recover symmetric versions of Theorems 1 and 2. The
extra parameter λ allows the parties to further tailor
the protocol to achieve their desired bounds, while
taking into account their experimental limitations.
Discussion.— In this work, we have shown how to
verify any graph state shared between a network of
parties who may or may not be trusted.
Our general proof works for any graph state under
the most powerful adversarial model. As we have
seen, if we know more about the structure of the
graph or the dishonest parties, we can reduce the
scaling of the number of required copies with the
network size. Examples include the two-dimensional
cluster state, the complete graph state and the pen-
tagon, which are resources for universal computation
[1], anonymous communication [7] and secret shar-
ing/error correction [6], respectively. Noting that the
GHZ state is locally equivalent to the complete graph
Protocol 2 Symmetric Protocol for
Verification of Graph State
Input : The parties choose values of Ntest, Ntotal, λ.
Let S be the set of test measurements, and J = |S|.
1: An untrusted source generatesNtotal copies of the
graph state, and sends the shares to the parties.
2: The parties repeat the following for j = 1, ..., J:
(a) The CRS chooses λNtest copies from the re-
maining Ntotal − (j − 1)λNtest copies inde-
pendently and uniformly at random. These
are split into λ sets of Ntest copies, again at
random by the CRS. For each set of Ntest
copies, the CRS chooses a random party to
be the Verifier.
(b) For each copy, the corresponding Verifier
instructs each party to perform the mea-
surement corresponding to their part of the
stabiliser Sj .
(c) For each copy, the parties send their mea-
surement outcome to the Verifier, who cal-
culates the total measurement outcome.
The copy passes the test if the total mea-
surement outcome is +1. Let Npass,j be
the number of copies that pass the stabiliser
test for Sj .
3: The CRS uniformly randomly chooses a single
copy from the remaining N ≡ Ntotal − λJNtest
copies that were not used for the tests in the pre-
vious steps. The chosen single copy is called the
target copy. The others are discarded.
4: If Npass ≡
∑J
j=1Npass,j ≥ λJNtest − Ntest2J , the
parties use the target copy for their application;
otherwise, the target copy is discarded.
state, our results offer an alternative to the verifica-
tion protocol in [27]. The results here naturally ex-
tend to the case of qudit graphs, as in [20].
In fact, our techniques can be applied to many
more situations. Since quantum information appli-
cations typically have structured graphs, we expect
that the types of results we have illustrated can be ex-
tended to many interesting graphs and network sce-
5narios. It is likely that further optimisations can be
made to the protocol for efficiency [21, 32].
Our protocols are also easily implementable. In
fact, if one is interested in performing a verified ver-
sion of some task that makes use of graph states, then
using our protocol, it is essentially no more difficult
to do so than the original task, plus providing addi-
tional copies of the graph state. Typically, in optics
for example, this is not too much of a greater chal-
lenge. In fact, recent experiments verifying the GHZ
state [28] and secret sharing graph states [24] would
need minimal changes to carry out our protocol.
Acknowledgements.— We acknowledge funding
from the EPSRC, the ANR through the ANR-17-
CE24-0035 VanQuTe project, and the European
Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Pro-
gramme under Grant Agreement No. 820445 (QIA).
[1] R. Raussendorf and H. J. Briegel, “A one-way quan-
tum computer,” Physical Review Letters, vol. 86,
no. 22, 2001.
[2] J. F. Fitzsimons and E. Kashefi, “Unconditionally
verifiable blind quantum computation,” Physical Re-
view A, vol. 96, no. 1, 2017.
[3] E. Kashefi and A. Pappa, “Multiparty delegated
quantum computing,” Cryptography, vol. 1, no. 2,
p. 12, 2017.
[4] D. Gottesman, Stabilizer codes and quantum error
correction. PhD thesis, California Institute of Tech-
nology, 1997.
[5] B. A. Bell, M. S. Tame, D. Markham, W. J.
Wadsworth, and J. G. Rarity, “Experimental demon-
stration of a graph state quantum error-correction
code,” Nature Communications, vol. 5, 2014.
[6] D. Markham and B. C. Sanders, “Graph states for
quantum secret sharing,” Physical Review A, vol. 78,
no. 4, 2008.
[7] A. Unnikrishnan, I. J. MacFarlane, R. Yi, E. Dia-
manti, D. Markham, and I. Kerenidis, “Anonymity
for practical quantum networks,” Physical Review
Letters, vol. 122, no. 24, 2019.
[8] G. To´th and I. Apellaniz, “Quantum metrology from
a quantum information science perspective,” Journal
of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical, vol. 47,
no. 42, 2014.
[9] N. Friis, D. Orsucci, M. Skotiniotis, P. Sekatski,
V. Dunjko, H. J. Briegel, and W. Du¨r, “Flexible
resources for quantum metrology,” New Journal of
Physics, vol. 19, no. 6, 2017.
[10] N. Shettell and D. Markham, “Graph states as a re-
source for quantum metrology,” Physical Review Let-
ters, vol. 124, no. 11, 2020.
[11] M. Hein, J. Eisert, and H. J. Briegel, “Multiparty
entanglement in graph states,” Physical Review A,
vol. 69, no. 6, pp. 1–22, 2004.
[12] M. Hein, W. Du¨r, J. Eisert, R. Raussendorf,
M. van den Nest, and H. J. Briegel, “Entanglement
in graph states and its applications,” Quantum Com-
puters, Algorithms and Chaos, pp. 1–99, 2006.
[13] D. Markham, “Quantum lego: Graph states for
quantum computing and information processing,”
ERCIM News, no. 112, pp. 19–19, 2018.
[14] J. Eisert, D. Hangleiter, N. Walk, I. Roth,
D. Markham, R. Parekh, U. Chabaud, and
E. Kashefi, “Quantum certification and benchmark-
ing,” Nature Reviews Physics, pp. 1–9, 2020.
[15] G. M. D’Ariano, M. G. Paris, and M. F. Sacchi,
“Quantum tomography,” Advances in Imaging and
Electron Physics, vol. 128, pp. 205–308, 2003.
[16] B. Jungnitsch, T. Moroder, and O. Gu¨hne, “Entan-
glement witnesses for graph states: General theory
and examples,” Physical Review A, vol. 84, no. 3,
2011.
[17] D. Markham and A. Krause, “A simple protocol for
certifying graph states and applications in quantum
networks,” Cryptography, vol. 4, no. 1, 2020.
[18] M. Hayashi and T. Morimae, “Verifiable
measurement-only blind quantum computing
with stabilizer testing,” Physical Review Letters,
vol. 115, no. 22, 2015.
[19] Y. Takeuchi and T. Morimae, “Verification of many-
qubit states,” Physical Review X, vol. 8, no. 2, 2018.
[20] Y. Takeuchi, A. Mantri, T. Morimae, A. Mizutani,
and J. F. Fitzsimons, “Resource-efficient verification
of quantum computing using Serfling’s bound,” npj
Quantum Information, vol. 5, 2019.
[21] H. Zhu and M. Hayashi, “Efficient verification of pure
quantum states in the adversarial scenario,” Physical
Review Letters, vol. 123, no. 26, p. 260504, 2019.
[22] M. McKague, “Self-testing graph states,” in The-
ory of Quantum Computation, Communication, and
Cryptography - TQC 2011. Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science (D. Bacon, M. Martin-Delgado, and
M. Roetteler, eds.), vol. 6745, pp. 104–120, Springer
(Berlin, Heidelberg), 2011.
[23] J. Bermejo-Vega, D. Hangleiter, M. Schwarz,
R. Raussendorf, and J. Eisert, “Architectures for
Quantum Simulation Showing a Quantum Speedup,”
Physical Review X, vol. 8, no. 2, 2018.
[24] B. A. Bell, D. Markham, D. A. Herrera-Marti,
A. Marin, W. J. Wadsworth, J. G. Rarity, and M. S.
Tame, “Experimental demonstration of graph state
quantum secret sharing,” Nature Communications,
vol. 5, 2014.
[25] C. Cre´peau, D. Gottesman, and A. Smith, “Secure
multi-party quantum computation,” Proceedings of
the 34th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of
Computing, pp. 643–652, 2002.
[26] M. Ben-Or, C. Crepeau, D. Gottesman, A. Smith,
and A. Hassidim, “Secure multiparty quantum com-
putation with (only) a strict honest majority,” Pro-
ceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on
the Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 249–260,
2006.
[27] A. Pappa, A. Chailloux, S. Wehner, E. Diamanti, and
I. Kerenidis, “Multipartite entanglement verification
resistant against dishonest parties,” Physical Review
Letters, vol. 108, no. 26, 2012.
[28] W. McCutcheon, A. Pappa, B. A. Bell, A. McMillan,
A. Chailloux, T. Lawson, M. Mafu, D. Markham,
E. Diamanti, I. Kerenidis, J. Rarity, and M. S. Tame,
“Experimental verification of multipartite entangle-
ment in quantum networks,” Nature Communica-
tions, vol. 7, 2016.
[29] R. Yehia, E. Diamanti, and I. Kerenidis, “Compos-
able security for multipartite entanglement verifica-
tion,” arXiv:2004.07679, 2020.
[30] D. Markham and A. Marin, “Practical sharing of
quantum secrets over untrusted channels,” in Inter-
national Conference on Information Theoretic Secu-
rity, pp. 1–14, Springer, 2015.
[31] A. Uhlmann, “The ‘transition probability’ in the
state space of a *-algebra,” Reports on Mathemat-
6ical Physics, vol. 9, no. 2, 1976.
[32] S. Pallister, N. Linden, and A. Montanaro, “Opti-
mal verification of entangled states with local mea-
surements,” Physical Review Letters, vol. 120, no. 17,
p. 170502, 2018.
[33] R. J. Serfling, “Probability inequalities for the sum
in sampling without replacement,” The Annals of
Statistics, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 39–48, 1974.
[34] M. Christandl and S. Wehner, “Quantum anony-
mous transmissions,” in Advances in Cryptology -
ASIACRYPT 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence (B. Roy, ed.), vol. 3788, pp. 217–235, Springer
(Berlin, Heidelberg), 2005.
[35] M. Hillery, V. Buzek, and A. Berthiaume, “Quantum
secret sharing,” Physical Review A, vol. 59, no. 3,
1999.
[36] R. Laflamme, C. Miquel, J. P. Paz, and W. H. Zurek,
“Perfect quantum error correcting code,” Physical
Review Letters, vol. 77, no. 1, 1996.
[37] D. Aharonov, A. Ambainis, J. Kempe, and U. Vazi-
rani, “Quantum walks on graphs,” in Proceedings of
the 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of
Computing, pp. 50–59, 2001.
[38] R. Raussendorf, D. E. Browne, and H. J. Briegel,
“Measurement-based quantum computation on clus-
ter states,” Physical Review A, vol. 68, no. 2, 2003.
APPENDIX I: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Using Protocol 1, a network of parties, out of which any number may be dishonest, can verify any shared
graph state. We now prove the following Theorem to illustrate the security of this protocol, assuming for now
that the Verifier is an honest party.
Theorem 1. Assuming an honest Verifier, if we set Ntotal = 2× 2nNtest, Ntest = dm24n ln 2ne, and S as the
full set of stabilisers, the probability that the fidelity of the averaged state of the target copy (over all possible
choices of the tested copies and target copy) in Protocol 1 satisfies
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) ≥ 1−
2
√
c
2n
− 2× 2n
(
1− Npass
2nNtest
)
(6)
is at least 1− (2n)1− 2cm3 , where m, c are positive constants chosen such that 32m < c < (2
n−1)2
4 .
Proof. Our proof proceeds in stages. We will start by proving that if all stabiliser tests pass perfectly, then the
state must be the ideal graph state, up to local unitaries on the dishonest parts of the state. This means that
in order to pass perfectly, the source must create entanglement between the honest and dishonest parties. This
is given in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1.1. The only state that can pass all stabiliser tests perfectly in each round is |Ψ〉 = UD |G〉, where UD
is a unitary on the dishonest part of the state.
Proof. Let s be the Schmidt rank of the graph state |G〉 corresponding to the partition (H,D) into honest and
dishonest vertices, |H〉 be the state corresponding to the honest subgraph, and EH be the set of edges within
the honest subgraph.
Let bn(x) be a function that converts a decimal number x into its binary representation, and let us define
classical |H|-bit strings z,x ∈ {bn(0), ..., bn(2|H|−1)}, where |H| is the number of honest parties in the network.
We will use za to refer to the a
th element of z.
We will start by writing the Schmidt decomposition of the ideal state for the partition (H,D) from [11]. Some
terms in {|z〉} may be grouped together as they have the same dishonest part, as given by
|G〉 = 1√
2|H|
∑
z
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl |z〉H ⊗
∏
a∈H
( ∏
b∈N(a)
σ
(b)
Z
)za |G−H〉D (7)
=
1√
2|H|
∑
z
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl |z〉H ⊗
∣∣G−H(f(z))〉D , (8)
where f(z) depends on ⊕
i∈N(d)
zi,∀d ∈ D, and G−H is the dishonest subgraph. Then,
∣∣G−H(f(z))〉 is the state
corresponding to the dishonest subgraph with σZs applied to some vertices depending on z. This means that
for terms where ⊕
i∈N(d)
zi is the same for all d ∈ D, the corresponding dishonest part
∣∣G−H(f(z))〉 is the same,
and so the |z〉s of these are grouped together.
Let
∣∣H(x)〉 be the state corresponding to the honest subgraph with σZs applied according to x (for example,∣∣H(001)〉 corresponds to a 3-qubit graph with σZ applied to the third qubit). The set {∣∣H(x)〉} for all x forms
a complete basis (the graph state basis), as does the set {|z〉}. The unknown state in any round of Protocol 1
7can then be written using the following decomposition:
honest computational basis: |Ψ〉 =
∑
z
αz |z〉H ⊗ |ψz〉D , (9)
honest subgraph basis: |Ψ〉 =
∑
x
βx
∣∣H(x)〉H ⊗ |φx〉D , (10)
where αz, βx are complex coefficients, and both sets {|ψz〉}, {|φx〉} are the corresponding states on the dishonest
side. So far, we have assumed nothing about the portion of the state in control of the dishonest parties, since no
matter what the source supplies, the dishonest parties may do anything to their part to cheat in the protocol.
In Protocol 1, the test measurements are the elements Sj∈{1,...,2n} belonging to the full stabiliser group. These
measurements are generated by the stabiliser generators Ki∈{1,...,n} of each qubit i. Thus, the full stabiliser
group S is given by
S = 〈{Ki = Xi
∏
e∈N(i)
Ze}ni=1〉. (11)
We want to determine the form of the state given that all the test measurements pass perfectly. Let us now
group the test measurements into two sets, such that Group 1 contains only 1, Z for the honest part, and Group
2 contains everything else.
We first consider the measurements in Group 1. This set contains the stabiliser generators corresponding
to the dishonest qubits, i.e. Ki∈D. For each dishonest qubit, the honest part of the corresponding stabiliser
generator measurement will be composed of Z measurements on the honest qubits that are in the neighbourhood
of the dishonest qubit, and 1 on those that are not. We can then write the set of stabiliser generators belonging
to Group 1 as
{∀d ∈ D,
[
⊗
i∈N(d)
Zi ⊗
i/∈N(d)
1i
]
H
⊗ (M ′d)D}, (12)
where (M ′d)D is the measurement on the dishonest part, the form of which does not matter here. Let z, z
′ be
two strings in the computational basis expansion of |Ψ〉. If ⊕
i∈N(d)
zi 6= ⊕
i∈N(d)
z′i, then each honest measurement
⊗
i∈N(d)
Zi ⊗
i/∈N(d)
1i will give different outcomes for z, z
′, since the outcome of the Z measurement on all i ∈ N(d)
depends on the parity of the string (how many 1s). So, to pass perfectly, (M ′d)D must also give different
outcomes. In order to do this, the dishonest parties must be able to guess the honest parties’ outcome perfectly,
which means that they must be able to perfectly discriminate between the corresponding |ψz〉 , |ψz′〉; this tells
them the outcome they should get in order to pass the test. This means that we must have 〈ψz|ψz′〉 = 0. In
general, we can write this as
∀z, z′, if ∃d ∈ D such that ⊕
i∈N(d)
zi 6= ⊕
i∈N(d)
z′i, then 〈ψz|ψz′〉 = 0. (13)
We will now see that if the measurements in Group 2 pass perfectly, we get certain βx = 0, and for all βx 6= 0,
the corresponding |φx〉s will be orthogonal to each other.
To prove orthogonality, note that the set of stabiliser generators in Group 2 contain all the
stabiliser measurements with X in the honest part (the stabiliser generator corresponding to each
qubit in the honest set). So, the honest part of the measurements in the group is of the form
{X1M2M3...Mn,M1X2M3...Mn,M1M2X3...Mn, ...,M1...Xn}, where the honest measurement Mi∈{1,...,n} is ei-
ther 1, Z. Since no two states in the
∣∣H(x)〉 basis will give the same outcome for every one of these measurements,
in order to pass perfectly, the dishonest parties must be able to discriminate between all corresponding |φx〉 to
perfectly guess the honest outcome. We can write this as
∀x 6= x′, 〈φx|φx′〉 = 0. (14)
To determine which βx = 0, we will use the measurements with dishonest part M
′
D = (1...1)
′. Let A ⊂ H
be a set containing vertices in H such that all d ∈ D has an even number of neighbours in A. (Note that there
may be multiple such sets A.) Now, let Ki be the stabiliser generator of qubit i of |G〉, and ki be the stabiliser
generator of qubit i of |H〉. We can then write a subset of the Group 2 measurements as∏
i∈A
Ki =
∏
i∈A
(ki)H ⊗ 1′D. (15)
When the dishonest parties are asked to measure 1, they must always give outcome +1. So, in order to pass
8perfectly, the honest part must also give +1 outcome. In the expansion of the state in Equation (10), if for
any set A, we do not have an even number of σZs on the qubits i ∈ A in the honest subgraph, then the honest
measurement will not give outcome +1. Since the positions of the σZs are determined by the string x, passing
the Group 2 measurements perfectly tells us that
if ∃A s.t. ⊕
i∈A
xi = 1, then βx = 0. (16)
In this way, we are left with s non-zero βxs. We can write the set A as
A = {i ∈ H | ∃z, z′ such that ∀d ∈ D, ⊕
i∈N(d)
zi = ⊕
i∈N(d)
z′i, and zi ⊕ z′i = 1}. (17)
Writing i ∈ A using Equation (17), the condition on βx in Equation (16) can be written as
if ∃z, z′ such that ∀d ∈ D, ⊕
i∈N(d)
zi = ⊕
i∈N(d)
z′i,
then βx = 0 if ⊕
i∈H
(zi ⊕ z′i) ∧ xi = 1. (18)
We will now relate the two expressions we have for the honest parts of the state. The graph state basis can
be expressed in terms of the computational basis by∣∣H(x)〉 = 1√
2|H|
∑
z
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl
(−1)⊕i xi∧zi |z〉 . (19)
Substituting in Equation (10) and grouping, we get
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2|H|
∑
x
βx
∑
z
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl
(−1)⊕i xi∧zi |z〉H |φx〉D
=
∑
z
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl |z〉H
1√
2|H|
∑
x
βx(−1)
⊕
i
xi∧zi |φx〉D . (20)
Comparing the above expression with Equation (9) in terms of the coefficients of each |z〉,
αz |ψz〉 = (−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl 1√
2|H|
∑
x
βx(−1)
⊕
i
xi∧zi |φx〉 , ∀z,
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl
αz |ψz〉 = 1√
2|H|
∑
x
βx(−1)
⊕
i
xi∧zi |φx〉 , ∀z. (21)
On the other hand, expressing the computational basis in terms of the graph state basis gives
|z〉 = 1√
2|H|
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl∑
x
(−1)⊕i xi∧zi ∣∣H(x)〉 . (22)
Substituting in Equation (9) and grouping, we get
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2|H|
∑
z
αz(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl∑
x
(−1)⊕i xi∧zi ∣∣H(x)〉H |ψz〉D
=
∑
x
∣∣H(x)〉H 1√2|H|∑z (−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl
(−1)⊕i xi∧ziαz |ψz〉D . (23)
Comparing the above expression with Equation (10) in terms of the coefficients of
∣∣H(x)〉,
βx |φx〉 = 1√
2|H|
∑
z
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl
(−1)⊕i xi∧ziαz |ψz〉 , ∀x. (24)
Note that for certain x, βx = 0. In Equation (21), some terms will then be zero. In Equation (24), the whole
left-hand side will then be zero. If any of the expressions are equal to zero, we can use them to show that
the terms are grouped as in the Schmidt decomposition of |G〉 in Equation (8), which will allow us to simplify
Equations (24) and (9). If none of the expressions are equal to zero, we will see that the same simplification
applies. This is encapsulated in Lemma 1.1A.
9Lemma 1.1A. Equations (24) and (9) can be written as
βv |φv〉 =
√
2|H|
s
∑
w
(−1)⊕i vi∧wiαw |ψw〉 , ∀v, (25)
|Ψ〉 =
∑
z
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl
αw |z〉H ⊗ |ψw〉D , (26)
where w, v ∈ {bn(0), ..., bn(s− 1)}.
Proof. We will prove this in a series of steps. First, we show that the |ψz〉s are equal for the |z〉 terms that are
grouped together in the Schmidt decomposition of |G〉 in Equation (8), and that their corresponding αzs are
equal up to ±1. For any strings z, z′ such that ∀d ∈ D, ⊕
i∈N(d)
zi = ⊕
i∈N(d)
z′i, we have using Equation (21),
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl
αz |ψz〉 − (−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
z′k∧z′l
αz′ |ψz′〉 = 1√
2|H|
∑
x
βx
[
(−1)⊕i xi∧zi − (−1)⊕i xi∧z
′
i
]
|φx〉 . (27)
From Equation (18), we know that for such strings z, z′, if ⊕
i
(zi ⊕ z′i) ∧ xi = 1, then βx = 0. Otherwise, for the
terms where βx 6= 0, we have
0 = ⊕
i
(zi ⊕ z′i) ∧ xi = ⊕
i
[
(xi ∧ zi)⊕ (xi ∧ z′i)
]
=
[
⊕
i
(xi ∧ zi)
]
⊕
[
⊕
i
(xi ∧ z′i)
]
, (28)
which gives ⊕
i
xi ∧ zi = ⊕
i
xi ∧ z′i, and subsequently
(−1)⊕i xi∧zi = (−1)⊕i xi∧z
′
i
. (29)
Substituting in Equation (27), we get that ∀z, z′ such that ∀d ∈ D, ⊕
i∈N(d)
zi = ⊕
i∈N(d)
z′i,
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl
αz |ψz〉 = (−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
z′k∧z′l
αz′ |ψz′〉 . (30)
Next, we will simplify the expression for βx |φx〉, by substituting Equations (30) and (29) in Equation (24) to
get
βx |φx〉 = 1√
2|H|
∑
z
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl
(−1)⊕i xi∧ziαz |ψz〉 , ∀x such that βx 6= 0
=
1√
2|H|
[ ∑
z s. t.⊕
i∈N(d1)
zi=0∧...
∧ ⊕
i∈N(d|D|)
zi=0
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl
(−1)⊕i xi∧ziαz |ψz〉
+ ...+
∑
z s. t.⊕
i∈N(d1)
zi=1∧...
∧ ⊕
i∈N(d|D|)
zi=1
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl
(−1)⊕i xi∧ziαz |ψz〉
]
. (31)
There are s non-zero expressions for βx |φx〉, since there are s non-zero βxs. There are also s sum terms on
the right-hand side of the above expression. There are a total of 2|H| terms of αz |ψz〉, grouped together if
∀d ∈ D, ⊕
i∈N(d)
zi is the same. This means that, within each of the s sum terms, there are
2|H|
s terms. From
Equation (30), we know that (−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl
αz |ψz〉 is the same for each of these terms. Further, we know
from Equation (29) that (−1)⊕i xi∧zi is the same for each of these terms (since βx 6= 0). Then, we can write our
expression using s terms (corresponding to each sum term in the above expression).
In this way, we are left with terms depending on s unique variables that can take any value 0 or 1, instead
of 2|H| variables that can only take certain values. Defining new variables w,v ∈ {bn(0), ..., bn(s− 1)}, we can
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write the above as
βv |φv〉 = 1√
2|H|
2|H|
s
∑
w
(−1)⊕i vi∧wiαw |ψw〉 =
√
2|H|
s
∑
w
(−1)⊕i vi∧wiαw |ψw〉 , ∀v. (32)
Note that ∀w 6= w′, 〈ψw|ψw′〉 = 0, from Equation (13) and the fact that any two states with different w have
different ⊕
i∈N(d)
zi for some d ∈ D. As before, ∀v 6= v′, 〈φv|φv′〉 = 0, from Equation (14). This means that now,
instead of having 2|H| variables z,x ∈ {bn(0), ..., bn(2|H|− 1)}, we have s variables w,v ∈ {bn(0), ..., bn(s− 1)}.
Finally, we simplify the computational basis expression for |Ψ〉 in Equation (9). The terms should now be
grouped as in Equation (8), with s terms, as
|Ψ〉 =
∑
z
αz |z〉H ⊗ |ψz〉D =
∑
z
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl
αw |z〉H ⊗ |ψw〉D , (33)
where w = f(z) depends on ⊕
i∈N(d)
zi,∀d ∈ D.
If none of the expressions are equal to zero, we have s = 2|H|, and so we can simply rename z as w, as they
take values from the same set {bn(0), ..., bn(s− 1)}.
Our next aim is to determine the value of αw. From the normalisation condition, 〈Ψ|Ψ〉 = 1, we have∑
w
2|H|
s
|αw|2 = 1 =⇒
∑
w
|αw|2 = s
2|H|
, (34)
since there are 2
|H|
s terms of |z〉 corresponding to each w, as we saw before.
To get the orthogonality conditions, we take the overlap of each non-zero expression for βv |φv〉 with another
non-zero expression for βv′ |φv′〉, to get (s− 1) equations for all v 6= v′ given by
β†vβv′ 〈φv|φv′〉 = 0 =
2|H|
s2
[∑
w
(−1)⊕i vi∧wi(−1)⊕i v
′
i∧wi |αw|2 〈ψw|ψw〉
]
, (35)
which we can write as ∑
w
(−1)⊕i pi∧wi |αw|2 = 0, ∀p ∈ {bn(1), ..., bn(s− 1)}. (36)
(Note that since the overlap is taken with two different expressions, p can never be 0...0.)
We will now solve the s equations for s variables (from the normalisation and orthogonality conditions) using
the matrix method, formulating the system of equations as Au = b. The matrix A is of size s × s, while u, b
are of size s× 1. u is a column vector containing each |αw|2, and b is a column vector giving the normalisation
and orthogonality conditions. A has 1s in its first row and column, and the other elements are ±1. The 1s on
the first row are from the normalisation condition. The 1s on the first column occur because for w = 0...0, the
exponent of (−1) will always be 0 (since the AND of anything with 0...0 gives 0...0), and so the sign of |αw|2 is
always +1. We then have
A =

1 1 ... 1
1 ±1 ... ±1
... ... ... ...
1 ±1 ... ±1
 , u =

|α00...00|2
|α00...01|2
...
|α11...11|2
 , b = s2|H|

1
0
...
0
 . (37)
The values of |αw|2 are then determined by
|α00...00|2
|α00...01|2
...
|α11...11|2
 = A−1 s2|H|

1
0
...
0
 = s2|H|

A−11,1
A−12,1
...
A−1s,1
 . (38)
Thus, the solution to the set of equations is equal to s
2|H| times the first column of A−1. Using Equations (34)
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and (36), let us now write more precisely what the elements of A are:
A =

(−1)⊕00...00∧00...00 (−1)⊕00...00∧00...01 ... (−1)⊕00...00∧11...11
(−1)⊕00...01∧00...00 (−1)⊕00...01∧00...01 ... (−1)⊕00...01∧11...11
... ... ... ...
(−1)⊕11...11∧00...00 (−1)⊕11...11∧00...01 ... (−1)⊕11...11∧11...11
 , (39)
where by ⊕a ∧ b we mean computing the AND operation of the strings a, b, and then XORing all the resulting
bits (or, in other words, finding the parity of the AND of the strings a, b).
Let us take pi,wj to be the i
th and jth strings in the set {bn(0), ..., bn(s − 1)}, where i, j ∈ {1, ..., s}. (For
example, if i = 2, j = 3, we have p2 = 00...01,w3 = 00...10.) Then, taking i to denote the row and j to denote
the column, A is given by
A =

(−1)⊕p1∧w1 (−1)⊕p1∧w2 ... (−1)⊕p1∧ws
(−1)⊕p2∧w1 (−1)⊕p2∧w2 ... (−1)⊕p2∧ws
... ... ... ...
(−1)⊕ps∧w1 (−1)⊕ps∧w2 ... (−1)⊕ps∧ws
 . (40)
In general, the (i, j)th element of A is given by
Ai,j = (−1)⊕pi∧wj . (41)
Note that since pi = wi∀i, we have Ai,j = (−1)⊕pi∧wj = (−1)⊕wi∧pj = (−1)⊕pj∧wi = Aj,i, and so A is
symmetric. We will now show that the inverse of the matrix A is given by A−1 = 1sA. To prove this, we just
have to show that AA−1 = 1. Denoting AA =M, we have
AA−1 = A1
s
A = 1
s
AA = 1
s
M. (42)
The (i, j)th element of M is given by
Mi,j =
s∑
k=1
(−1)⊕pi∧wk(−1)⊕pk∧wj =
s∑
k=1
(−1)⊕pi∧wk(−1)⊕pj∧wk =
s∑
k=1
(−1)⊕(pi⊕pj)∧wk . (43)
When i = j, we have pi ⊕ pj = 00...00, and so for every wk, we always have (−1)0. Thus, we have Mi,i =∑s
k=1 1 = s. When i 6= j, the AND operation is performed on the same string pi⊕pj and wk,∀k. In this case,
pi ⊕ pj ∈ {bn(1), ..., bn(s − 1)}, as their sum can only be 00...00 if i = j. Thus, if we sum over the AND of
this string with each possible w ∈ {00...00, ..., 11...11}, we get an equal number of +1s and −1s. So, this sum
is equal to 0. We can therefore say
Mi,j = δji s, (44)
which meansM = s1. Substituting in Equation (42), we find AA−1 = 1. Thus, A−1 = 1sA, which we substitute
in Equation (38) to get
|α0...0|2
|α0...1|2
...
|α1...1|2
 = s2|H|

A−11,1
A−12,1
...
A−1s,1
 = 1s × s2|H|

A1,1
A2,1
...
As,1
 = 1s × s2|H|

1
1
...
1
 =

1
2|H|
1
2|H|
...
1
2|H|
 . (45)
This gives each αw = ± 1√
2|H|
. Let us substitute the value of αw in Equation (33). We get
|Ψ〉 = ± 1√
2|H|
∑
z
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl |z〉H ⊗ |ψw〉D
= ± 1√
2|H|
∑
z
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl |z〉H ⊗
∣∣ψ(f(z))〉D . (46)
Finally, ρ
|Ψ〉
H only depends on the honest Schmidt basis. Comparing the above expression with Equation (8)
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shows that the honest Schmidt basis of the actual state |Ψ〉 is equal to the honest Schmidt basis of the ideal
state |G〉, giving ρ|Ψ〉H = ρ|G〉H . If |Ψ〉 is a purification of ρ|Ψ〉H , and |G〉 is a purification of ρ|G〉H , then due to the
unitary equivalence of purifications, we must have |Ψ〉 = UD |G〉 if all the test measurements pass perfectly. This
concludes the proof of Lemma 1.1.
The above Lemma 1.1 tells us that only the state UD |G〉 (the ideal state up to local unitaries on the dishonest
side), or equivalently ρ
|G〉
H , always passes the stabiliser test Sj in any round j. For simplicity of presentation later
on, we now analyse the case where the number of stabilisers that need to be measured to have the analogous
statement of Lemma 1.1 is J. We fix Ntotal such that N ≡ Ntotal − JNtest = JNtest is the total number of
remaining copies, out of which one is chosen to be the target copy. Let k be the number of copies out of the
remaining N copies that are ρ
|G〉
H . Now, using the Serfling bound, we will find a bound on
k
N in the following
Lemma, which is an adaptation of the method of Takeuchi et al. [20] to our scenario of verifying general graph
states with any number of dishonest parties.
Lemma 1.2 (adapted from [20]). The probability that the fraction of states that would pass all stabiliser tests
out of the remaining copies in Protocol 1 is given by
k
N
≥ 1− 2
√
c
J
− 2J
(
1− Npass
JNtest
)
(47)
is at least 1− J1− 2cm3 .
Proof. Consider a set of binary random variables Y = {Y1, ..., YT } where Yt ∈ {0, 1}. Let us set the value of
Yt = 0 if the stabiliser test passes on copy t, and otherwise Yt = 1. Then, by Serfling’s bound [33], where
T = L+R, for any 0 < ν < 1,
Pr
[∑
t∈Π
Yt ≤ LR
∑
t∈Π
Yt + Lν
]
≥ 1− exp [− 2ν2LR2
(L+R)(R+ 1)
]
, (48)
where Π is a set of R samples chosen independently and uniformly randomly from Y without replacement, and
Π is the complementary set of Π. The expression inside the probability bracket is then an upper bound on the
number of copies out of the remaining that would fail the stabiliser test, given a number of copies that pass.
Now, let us consider the stabiliser measurement Sj∈{1,...,J}. We take L = Ntotal− jNtest, and R = Ntest. Let
us then set ν =
√
c
J2 , which is chosen in this way to maximise both the fidelity and probability in our resulting
expression (this implies 0 <
√
c < J2). Let Π(j) be the set of copies on which each Sj was measured, and Π(j) be
the set of remaining copies after measuring Sj . Finally, we denote the probability expression on the right-hand
side of Equation (48) for the stabiliser test in round j as qj . Then, after the stabiliser test for Sj is performed,
we have
Pr
[ ∑
t∈Π(j)
Yt ≤ Ntotal − jNtest
Ntest
∑
t∈Π(j)
Yt + (Ntotal − jNtest)ν
]
≥ qj . (49)
In other words, with probability at least qj , the maximum number of copies that would fail the stabiliser test of
Sj out of the remaining is given by Ntotal−jNtestNtest
∑
t∈Π(j) Yt + (Ntotal− jNtest)ν. Then, the minimum number of
copies that would pass the Sj test is given by the total number of remaining copies minus this maximum number
of failed copies. Thus, after all stabiliser tests are performed, we can lower bound the number of remaining
copies which would pass all of the stabiliser tests by summing over all j’s corresponding to all stabilisers Sj .
13
Recalling that we denote the number of ‘good’ remaining copies by k, we then have
k ≥ (Ntotal − JNtest)−
J∑
j=1
[
Ntotal − jNtest
Ntest
∑
t∈Π(j)
Yt + (Ntotal − jNtest)ν
]
= 2JNtest − JNtest − Ntotal
Ntest
J∑
j=1
∑
t∈Π(j)
Yt +
J∑
j=1
j
∑
t∈Π(j)
Yt − νJNtotal +
J∑
j=1
jNtestν
≥ JNtest − νJNtotal − Ntotal
Ntest
J∑
j=1
∑
t∈Π(j)
Yt
≥ JNtest − νJNtotal − Ntotal
Ntest
(JNtest −Npass)
= JNtest − νJ× 2× JNtest − 2JNtest
Ntest
(JNtest −Npass)
=
(
J− 2√c− 2J2 + 2JNpass
Ntest
)
Ntest, (50)
which gives the fraction of ‘good’ remaining copies, kN , as
k
N
≥
(
J− 2√c− 2J2 + 2JNpassNtest
)
Ntest
Ntotal − JNtest
=
J− 2√c− 2J2 + 2JNpassNtest
J
= 1− 2
√
c
J
− 2J
(
1− Npass
JNtest
)
. (51)
From Equation (48), we then get for qj , the probability corresponding to the test Sj ,
qj = 1− exp
[
− 2ν
2(Ntotal − jNtest)N2test
(Ntotal − jNtest +Ntest)(Ntest + 1)
]
= 1− exp
[
− 2ν2Ntest 1Ntotal−jNtest+Ntest
Ntotal−jNtest × Ntest+1Ntest
]
= 1− exp
[
− 2ν2Ntest 1
1 + 12J−j
1
1 + 1Ntest
]
. (52)
Now, let us compute the total probability corresponding to the full set of J stabiliser tests. Taking Ntest =
mJ4 ln J and using J ≥ 2 =⇒ 1
1+ 1J
≥ 23 , and Ntest ≥ 1 =⇒ 11+ 1Ntest ≥
1
2 , we get the total probability
corresponding to J stabiliser tests as
J∏
j=1
qj ≥ qJJ =
[
1− exp
(
− 2ν2Ntest 1
1 + 12J−J
1
1 + 1Ntest
)]J
≥
[
1− exp
(
− 2ν
2Ntest
3
)]J
≥
[
1− exp
(
− 2ν
2mJ4
3
ln J
)]J
=
[
1− J− 2cm3
]J
≥ 1− J1− 2cm3 . (53)
Thus, the event that the fraction of ‘good’ copies that pass all the stabiliser tests Sj is lower bounded by
k
N ≥ 1− 2
√
c
J − 2J
(
1− NpassJNtest
)
occurs with probability greater than or equal to 1− J1− 2cm3 .
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In the final step of the protocol, one copy is chosen, out of the remaining N ≡ Ntotal − JNtest copies, to be
the target copy. Let us now finish the proof by proving Lemma 1.3, relating the above analysis to the averaged
state of this target copy.
Lemma 1.3. The probability that the fidelity of the averaged state of the target copy in Protocol 1 satisfies
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) ≥
k
N
(54)
is at least 1− J1− 2cm3 .
Proof. Now, ρavgH is the reduced state of the honest parties of the averaged state, where the average is taken
over all uniformly random selections of the target copy from the total number of remaining copies N, and given
by
ρavgH =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ρiH . (55)
Here, ρiH denotes the reduced state of the honest parties in each round (for each one of the remaining copies).
We now want to find the fidelity F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) between this averaged state and the ideal state (in terms of the
honest reduced states). From the concavity of fidelity,
F (ρ,
∑
i
piσi) ≥
∑
i
piF (ρ, σi). (56)
We can use this to get
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) = F (ρ
|G〉
H ,
1
N
N∑
i=1
ρiH) ≥
1
N
N∑
i=1
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
i
H). (57)
Now, we know that for a number k of the remaining states, we have ρiH = ρ
|G〉
H with probability at least
1− J1− 2cm3 . Assuming the worst case scenario that the rest of the states, each denoted by ρunknownH , have zero
fidelity with the ideal state, we get
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) ≥
1
N
[
kF (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
|G〉
H ) + (N− k)F (ρ|G〉H , ρunknownH )
]
≥ 1
N
[
k× 1 + (N− k)× 0
]
=
k
N
. (58)
Our final result then tells us that, with the appropriate choice of Ntotal, Ntest, the parties can ensure that
with probability at least 1− J1− 2cm3 , the fidelity of the averaged state of the target copy satisfies
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) ≥ 1−
2
√
c
J
− 2J(1− Npass
JNtest
)
. (59)
Note that in order to ensure that the probability and fidelity are greater than zero, the choice of the constants
m, c must be such that 32m < c <
(J−1)2
4 . Setting J = 2
n, this concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
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APPENDIX II: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We now give some examples of types of graph states that are useful for specific purposes, and prove the
following Theorem to show how we can reduce the resources required to verify them (in the presence of dishonest
parties) in each case.
Theorem 2. If |G〉 is either
A. a complete graph state with dishonest parties anywhere in the network, or
B. a pentagon graph state with either one, three or four dishonest parties anywhere in the network, or two
dishonest parties who are adjacent, or
C. a cycle graph state with either one, n−2 or n−1 dishonest parties anywhere in the network, or any other
number of dishonest parties who are adjacent, or
D. a 1D cluster state with either one or n−1 dishonest parties anywhere in the network, or any other number
of adjacent honest and dishonest parties, or
E. a 2D cluster state with either one or n− 1 dishonest parties anywhere in the network, or any other set of
adjacent dishonest parties that forms a square or rectangle anywhere in the network,
and we set Ntotal = 2nNtest, Ntest = dmn4 lnne, and S as the set of stabiliser generators, assuming an honest
Verifier, the probability that the fidelity of the averaged state of the target copy (over all possible choices of the
tested copies and target copy) in Protocol 1 satisfies
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) ≥ 1−
2
√
c
n
− 2n
(
1− Npass
nNtest
)
(60)
is at least 1− n1− 2cm3 , where m, c are positive constants chosen such that 32m < c < (n−1)
2
4 .
For clarity, we will treat each example separately. To prove such a statement, we start by inspecting the proof
of Theorem 1, to understand how the information about passing the stabiliser tests is used. In Lemma 1.1, this
is firstly used to identify which elements of {|ψz〉}, {|φx〉} are orthogonal; however, as we see in Equations (13)
and (14), this follows from passing purely the set of stabiliser generator measurements. It then remains to show
that the conditions on which βxs are zero, given in Equation (16), may also be deduced from only passing the
stabiliser generator tests. (We point out that if the set A is empty, which can be checked by examining the
graph for the partition (H,D), then from passing the full set of stabiliser measurements, we cannot set any βx
to be zero, and so we can trivially see that only the stabiliser generator measurements are required.) If this
is true, it is possible for the parties to protect themselves against dishonest action even by running Protocol 1
with this simpler set of test measurements.
Recall that once we know which βxs must be zero, we can determine which terms have the same αz, |ψz〉,
allowing us to group the |z〉 terms in Equation (9) in the same way as in the Schmidt decomposition of the ideal
graph state, leading to the conclusion that |Ψ〉 = UD |G〉. Thus, once we have derived the conditions for βx to
be zero, we can simply continue with the remainder of the proof of Lemma 1.1. Inserting J = n into Lemmas
1.2 and 1.3, we obtain the desired results.
In the following, we adapt our general proof in this way to cater to the specificities of complete graphs,
cycle graphs and cluster states, with particular characteristics of the dishonest set of parties. Armed with this
information, we will show that our parties can verify each graph state in an efficient way.
Complete graph states
Complete graph states, where every vertex is connected to every other vertex, are locally equivalent to GHZ
states. As we have seen, such states are central to schemes for quantum anonymous transmission [7, 34], as
well as secret sharing [35], metrology [8], and many other applications. A verification test for GHZ states was
already proposed and analysed in [27]; however, we now approach this goal using the Serfling bound method.
This subsection also serves to provide a comprehensive example of how our protocol and analysis work for this
particular graph state, and so we will go through all steps of the proof.
Due to the symmetry of complete graphs (Figure 2), we will see that we can protect against any number of
dishonest parties anywhere in the network by only measuring the stabiliser generators. Recall that we denote
the stabiliser generator corresponding to the ith qubit as Ki. Let the parties now run Protocol 1 with S as the
set of generators; our result is given in the following Theorem.
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FIG. 2: 5-qubit and 6-qubit complete graph states.
Theorem 2A. If |G〉 is a complete graph state, and we set Ntotal = 2nNtest, Ntest = dmn4 lnne, and S as
the set of stabiliser generators, the probability that the fidelity of the averaged state of the target copy (over all
possible choices of the tested copies and target copy) in Protocol 1 satisfies
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) ≥ 1−
2
√
c
n
− 2n
(
1− Npass
nNtest
)
(61)
is at least 1− n1− 2cm3 , where m, c are positive constants chosen such that 32m < c < (n−1)
2
4 .
Proof. As before, we prove this in stages, now for the specific case of complete graph states.
Lemma 2A.1. The only state that can pass all stabiliser generator tests perfectly in each round is |Ψ〉 = UD |G〉,
where UD is a unitary on the dishonest part of the state.
Proof. Complete graph states are of Schmidt rank 2, i.e. there are always exactly two terms in their Schmidt
decomposition. The Schmidt decomposition of a complete graph state with respect to any partition (H,D) is
|G〉 = 1√
2|H|
∑
z
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl |z〉H ⊗
∏
a∈H
( ∏
b∈N(a)
σ
(b)
Z
)za |G−H〉D
=
1√
2|H|
[( ∑
∆(z)=0(mod 4)
|z〉 −
∑
∆(z)=2(mod 4)
|z〉
)
H
⊗ ∣∣G−H(00...00)〉D
+
( ∑
∆(z)=1(mod 4)
|z〉 −
∑
∆(z)=3(mod 4)
|z〉
)
H
⊗ ∣∣G−H(11...11)〉D
]
, (62)
where
∣∣G−H(00...00)〉 is the dishonest subgraph with no σZs on any vertices, and ∣∣G−H(11...11)〉 is the dishonest
subgraph with σZs on all vertices. Thus, the reduced state of the honest parties of this ideal state is given by
ρ
|G〉
H =
1
2|H|
[( ∑
∆(z)=0(mod 4)
|z〉 −
∑
∆(z)=2(mod 4)
|z〉
)( ∑
∆(z)=0(mod 4)
〈z| −
∑
∆(z)=2(mod 4)
〈z|
)
+
( ∑
∆(z)=1(mod 4)
|z〉 −
∑
∆(z)=3(mod 4)
|z〉
)( ∑
∆(z)=1(mod 4)
〈z| −
∑
∆(z)=3(mod 4)
〈z|
)]
. (63)
From Equations (9) and (10), we know that our state can be written in general as |Ψ〉 = ∑z αz |z〉H ⊗ |ψz〉D
and |Ψ〉 = ∑x βx ∣∣H(x)〉H ⊗|φx〉D. Let us now write the test measurements, which are the stabiliser generators
here. Since, for the complete graph, each vertex shares an edge with every other vertex, the stabiliser generators
are given by
Ki = Xi
∏
e∈V
Ze, (64)
where V is the set of vertices in the graph. We will again group the test measurements into Group 1, where the
honest measurement only consists of Zs, and Group 2, which contains the remaining measurements. In order
to pass perfectly, the overall outcome of each measurement must be +1.
Let us first consider the Group 1 measurements. Any |z〉 that has an even number of 1s (parity of z is 0)
will give outcome +1 for the honest measurement Z...Z, and so the dishonest measurement must give outcome
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+1 in order to pass the test. Any |z〉 that has an odd number of 1s (parity of z is 1) will give outcome
−1 for Z...Z, and so the dishonest measurement must give outcome −1. So, in order to pass perfectly, the
dishonest parties must be able to discriminate perfectly between the states
∣∣ψ∆(z)=0(mod 2)〉 and ∣∣ψ∆(z)=1(mod 2)〉,
where ∆(z) is the Hamming weight of z (number of 1s in the string). This means that for all z, we have〈
ψ∆(z)=0(mod 2)
∣∣ψ∆(z)=1(mod 2)〉 = 0. (Note that this can be seen from the general proof, which tells us in this
case that ∀z, z′ such that ⊕
i
zi 6= ⊕
i
z′i, we have 〈ψz|ψz′〉 = 0.)
Now, let us see what happens if the Group 2 measurements pass perfectly. This group will have all mea-
surements XZ...Z, ZXZ...Z, ..., Z...ZX in the honest part, and the dishonest part of each will be (Z...Z)′ (so
the same dishonest part for each). To pass perfectly, the dishonest parties must be able to always give the
correct outcome; however, they only know that the measurement they must do is (Z...Z)′, and this does not tell
them whether the honest parties are measuring XZ...Z, ZXZ...Z, ..., Z...ZX. In order for the dishonest parties
to always output the correct outcome for all of these measurements (to make the overall outcome +1), the
only terms that can appear in Equation (10) are the honest subgraph (
∣∣H(00...00)〉), and the honest subgraph
with σZs on all the vertices (
∣∣H(11...11)〉). So, passing the Group 2 measurements tells us that βx = 0 for
x /∈ {00...00, 11...11}. (Note that this is the same conclusion that can be derived from measuring the full set of
stabilisers in the general proof. Every pair of honest vertices forms a possible set A here, and we have βx = 0
if ∃A such that ⊕
i∈A
xi = 1. The only remaining strings are then those x that have all elements equal to one
another.)
We can then write the state in Equation (10) as
|Ψ〉 = β00...00
∣∣H(00...00)〉H |φ00...00〉D + β11...11 ∣∣H(11...11)〉H |φ11...11〉D . (65)
Since measuring (Z...Z)′ on |φ00...00〉 must give outcome +1, and on |φ11...11〉 it must give outcome −1 (in order
to always get the total outcome to be +1), the dishonest parties must be able to perfectly discriminate between
these two states, and so we must have 〈φ00...00|φ11...11〉 = 0. Then, following the steps in the general proof, we
get
βx |φx〉 = 1√
2|H|
[∑
z
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl
(−1)⊕i xi∧ziαz |ψz〉D
]
, ∀x such that βx 6= 0, (66)
0 =
1√
2|H|
[∑
z
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl
(−1)⊕i xi∧ziαz |ψz〉D
]
, ∀x such that βx = 0. (67)
The solution of Equation (67), as adapted for complete graphs from the general proof, is ∀z, z′ such that
∆(z) mod 2 = ∆(z′) mod 2, we have
(−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl
αz |ψz〉 = (−1)
⊕
(k,l)∈EH
z′k∧z′l
αz′ |ψz′〉 . (68)
Recall that for complete graphs, all the honest vertices are connected to each other. Using this, we can simplify
the exponent ⊕
(k,l)∈EH
zk∧zl. Each (zk∧zl) will give 1 only if both zk, zl are 1. So, we can rephrase this using the
Hamming weight ∆(z), which tells us how many 1s are in the string z. Then, finding how many pairs (zk ∧ zl)
give 1 is equivalent to calculating ∆(z)C2.
Let us first take z, z′ such that ∆(z),∆(z′) = 0 (mod 2). We see that (−1)∆(z)C2 = (−1)∆(z′)C2 for ∆(z)
mod 4 = ∆(z′) mod 4. Similarly, if we take z, z′ such that ∆(z),∆(z′) = 1 (mod 2), we again find that
(−1)∆(z)C2 = (−1)∆(z′)C2 for ∆(z) mod 4 = ∆(z′) mod 4. Thus, we have
∀z, z′ such that ∆(z) = 0(mod 4),∆(z′) = 2(mod 4), αz |ψz〉 = −αz′ |ψz′〉 ,
∀z, z′ such that ∆(z) = 1(mod 4),∆(z′) = 3(mod 4), αz |ψz〉 = −αz′ |ψz′〉 . (69)
We can now write our state as
|Ψ〉 =
∑
z
αz |z〉H ⊗ |ψz〉D
= αz,∆(z)=0(mod 2)
[ ∑
∆(z)=0(mod 4)
|z〉 −
∑
∆(z)=2(mod 4)
|z〉
]
H
⊗ ∣∣ψz,∆(z)=0(mod 2)〉D
+ αz,∆(z)=1(mod 2)
[ ∑
∆(z)=1(mod 4)
|z〉 −
∑
∆(z)=3(mod 4)
|z〉
]
H
⊗ ∣∣ψz,∆(z)=1(mod 2)〉D . (70)
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Then, our expressions for βx |φx〉 can be written using Equation (32) as
β00...00 |φ00...00〉 =
√
2|H|
2
[
αz,∆(z)=0(mod 2)
∣∣ψz,∆(z)=0(mod 2)〉+ αz,∆(z)=1(mod 2) ∣∣ψz,∆(z)=1(mod 2)〉 ],
β11...11 |φ11...11〉 =
√
2|H|
2
[
αz,∆(z)=0(mod 2)
∣∣ψz,∆(z)=0(mod 2)〉− αz,∆(z)=1(mod 2) ∣∣ψz,∆(z)=1(mod 2)〉 ]. (71)
Now, recall that 〈φ00...00|φ11...11〉 = 0, and
〈
ψ∆(z)=0(mod 2)
∣∣ψ∆(z)=1(mod 2)〉 = 0. Using these orthogonality
conditions and taking the inner product of the two expressions above, we get∣∣αz,∆(z)=0(mod 2)∣∣2 − ∣∣αz,∆(z)=1(mod 2)∣∣2 = 0. (72)
By normalisation, we have ∣∣αz,∆(z)=0(mod 2)∣∣2 + ∣∣αz,∆(z)=1(mod 2)∣∣2 = 2
2|H|
. (73)
Solving these, we find that αz,∆(z)=0(mod 2), αz,∆(z)=1(mod 2) = ± 1√2|H| . Substituting this in Equation (70) gives
the state as
|Ψ〉 = ± 1√
2|H|
[( ∑
∆(z)=0(mod 4)
|z〉 −
∑
∆(z)=2(mod 4)
|z〉
)
H
⊗ ∣∣ψz,∆(z)=0(mod 2)〉D
±
( ∑
∆(z)=1(mod 4)
|z〉 −
∑
∆(z)=3(mod 4)
|z〉
)
H
⊗ ∣∣ψz,∆(z)=1(mod 2)〉D
]
, (74)
which gives
ρ
|Ψ〉
H =
1
2|H|
[( ∑
∆(z)=0(mod 4)
|z〉 −
∑
∆(z)=2(mod 4)
|z〉
)( ∑
∆(z)=0(mod 4)
〈z| −
∑
∆(z)=2(mod 4)
〈z|
)
+
( ∑
∆(z)=1(mod 4)
|z〉 −
∑
∆(z)=3(mod 4)
|z〉
)( ∑
∆(z)=1(mod 4)
〈z| −
∑
∆(z)=3(mod 4)
〈z|
)]
= ρ
|G〉
H . (75)
Thus, |Ψ〉 = UD |G〉.
Inserting J = n into Lemmas 1.2 and 1.3 concludes the proof.
Pentagon graph state
The 5-qubit cycle graph state, in the shape of a pentagon, is known to be useful for secret sharing [6], as
well as being the smallest quantum error correcting code that tolerates an arbitrary error on a single qubit [36].
Let us now consider all possible sets of dishonest parties sharing such a graph (Figure 3), and see how we can
reduce the resources required. We will show that in certain cases, by purely measuring the stabiliser generators,
we can determine that if all tests pass perfectly, the state |Ψ〉 = UD |G〉; this means that the parties can run the
simpler version of Protocol 1 (with S as the set of generators). We summarise the result in Theorem 2B.
Theorem 2B. If |G〉 is a pentagon graph state with either one, three or four dishonest parties anywhere in the
network, or two dishonest parties who are adjacent, and we set Ntotal = 2nNtest, Ntest = dmn4 lnne, and S as
the set of stabiliser generators, the probability that the fidelity of the averaged state of the target copy (over all
possible choices of the tested copies and target copy) in Protocol 1 satisfies
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) ≥ 1−
2
√
c
n
− 2n
(
1− Npass
nNtest
)
(76)
is at least 1− n1− 2cm3 , where m, c are positive constants chosen such that 32m < c < (n−1)
2
4 .
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FIG. 3: Sets of honest (H) and dishonest (D) parties for the pentagon graph state considered in Theorem 2B.
Proof. We will tackle this proof taking all possible sets of dishonest parties separately. For the sets of dishonest
parties specified in the statement of Theorem 2B, we will show certain steps in proving that by passing all
stabiliser generator tests, our state must be |Ψ〉 = UD |G〉. Then, as long as the honest parties know that the
set of dishonest parties belongs to this ‘allowed set’, they may simply measure the stabiliser generators instead
of the full stabiliser group.
One dishonest party
We will start with a scenario where one party in the network is dishonest. Without loss of generality, let us
assume party 5 is dishonest, as shown in Figure 3(a). Then, we can write the Schmidt decomposition of the
ideal state |G〉 with respect to the partition (H,D) as
|G〉 = 1√
24
∑
z
(−1)(z1∧z2)⊕(z2∧z3)⊕(z3∧z4) |z〉H ⊗ (σ(5)Z )z1(σ(5)Z )z4 |G−H〉D
=
1
4
[
(|0000〉+ |1001〉+ |0010〉 − |1011〉+ |0100〉 − |1101〉 − |0110〉 − |1111〉)H ⊗
∣∣G−H(0)〉D
+ (|0001〉+ |1000〉 − |0011〉+ |1010〉+ |0101〉 − |1100〉+ |0111〉+ |1110〉)H ⊗
∣∣G−H(1)〉D ]. (77)
(Note that, as expected, the dishonest part of the state, |G−H〉, is the same for honest parts with the same
value of ⊕
i∈N(d)
zi = z1 ⊕ z4.)
As usual, we start by writing our state in the honest computational and subgraph bases as in Equations
(9) and (10). Now, the test measurements, or the stabiliser generators in this case, are given by {XZ11Z ′,
ZXZ11′, 1ZXZ1′, 11ZXZ ′, Z11ZX ′}. We group them into Group 1 measurements {Z11ZX ′} and Group
2 measurements {XZ11Z ′, ZXZ11′,1ZXZ1′,11ZXZ ′}. From the Group 1 measurement passing perfectly,
we see that ∀z, z′ such that z1 ⊕ z4 6= z′1 ⊕ z′4, we must have 〈ψz|ψz′〉 = 0. (Note that this matches Equation
(13).) From the Group 2 measurements passing perfectly, we know that ∀x,x′, we have 〈φx|φx′〉 = 0.
We will now see how to set certain βx = 0 from just the stabiliser generators alone. The measurements
ZXZ11′,1ZXZ1′ must give outcome +1 to pass the test. Since the dishonest party asked to measure 1′
will always output +1, the honest measurements ZXZ1,1ZXZ must also give outcome +1. Further, the
measurements XZ11Z ′,11ZXZ ′ give outcome +1. Since the dishonest party asked to measure Z ′ does not
know whether the honest parties are measuring XZ11 or 11ZX, yet still manages to make the test pass
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perfectly, this means that the honest part of the state must give the same outcome for these two measurements.
With these conditions, we have βx = 0 ∀x /∈ {0000, 1001}. (Note that we get the same result from the full
stabiliser group: the possible sets A are {1, 4}, {2}, {3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4} and so βx = 0 if
x1 ⊕ x4 = 1, x2 = 1, or x3 = 1.)
Following the remaining steps of the general proof, we then get
|Ψ〉 = ± 1√
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[
(|0000〉+ |1001〉+ |0010〉 − |1011〉+ |0100〉 − |1101〉 − |0110〉 − |1111〉)H ⊗ |φ0000〉D
± (|0001〉+ |1000〉 − |0011〉+ |1010〉+ |0101〉 − |1100〉+ |0111〉+ |1110〉)H ⊗ |φ1001〉D
]
, (78)
which gives |Ψ〉 = UD |G〉.
Two dishonest parties
Let us start by considering parties 1, 2 and 3 as honest and parties 4 and 5 as dishonest, pictured in Figure
3(b). We will vary the dishonest parties later and see how this affects the results, but for now let us consider
the two dishonest parties to be adjacent to one another. The Schmidt decomposition of the ideal graph state
for this partition is given by
|G〉 = 1√
23
∑
z
(−1)(z1∧z2)⊕(z2∧z3) |z〉H ⊗ (σ(5)Z )z1(σ(4)Z )z3 |G−H〉D
=
1
2
√
2
[
(|000〉+ |010〉)H ⊗
∣∣G−H(00)〉D + (|001〉 − |011〉)H ⊗ ∣∣G−H(10)〉D
+ (|100〉 − |110〉)H ⊗
∣∣G−H(01)〉D + (|101〉+ |111〉)H ⊗ ∣∣G−H(11)〉D ]. (79)
(It is easy to see that for states with the same ⊕
i∈N(d)
zi, ∀d ∈ D, which here refers to states with the same value
of z1 and z3, the corresponding dishonest part |G−H〉 is the same.)
Let us now see whether we can make the desired statement by purely considering the stabiliser generators,
{XZ1(1Z)′, ZXZ(11)′,1ZX(Z1)′,11Z(XZ)′, Z11(ZX)′}. We group them, as usual, into Group 1 given by
{11Z(XZ)′, Z11(ZX)′}, and Group 2 given by {XZ1(1Z)′, ZXZ(11)′,1ZX(Z1)′}. By the measurements in
Group 1 passing perfectly, we see that ∀z, z′ such that z1 6= z′1 or z3 6= z′3, we have 〈ψz|ψz′〉 = 0, which can also
be seen from Equation (13). By the measurements in Group 2 passing perfectly, we have ∀x,x′, 〈φx|φx′〉 = 0.
Now, Group 2 contains the measurement ZXZ(11)′. In order to get outcome +1 here, the only terms of
the honest subgraph that can appear in Equation (10) are those that give +1 when measuring ZXZ. Thus,
the Group 2 measurements passing perfectly tells us that βx = 0 ∀x /∈ {000, 001, 100, 101}. (Note that by
using the full set of stabiliser measurements, we do not get more information than this, as the only possible set
A = {2} and so we know that if x2 = 1, then βx = 0.) Continuing with the steps of the general proof, we obtain
|Ψ〉 = UD |G〉.
By inspecting the stabiliser generators, we see that such an analysis holds whenever the two dishonest parties
are adjacent, as there will always be a measurement (11)′ that forces the corresponding honest outcome to be
+1. Thus, in this case, it suffices to measure the stabiliser generators. If the two dishonest parties are not
adjacent, however, there will not be such a measurement (11)′, and so the parties must measure the full set of
stabilisers.
Three dishonest parties
Let us now assume parties 1 and 2 are honest, while parties 3, 4 and 5 are dishonest, as in Figure 3(c), to
start with. The Schmidt decomposition is given by
|G〉 = 1√
22
∑
z
(−1)z1∧z2 |z〉H ⊗ (σ(5)Z )z1(σ(3)Z )z2 |G−H〉D
=
1
2
[
|00〉H ⊗
∣∣G−H(000)〉D + |01〉H ⊗ ∣∣G−H(100)〉D
+ |10〉H ⊗
∣∣G−H(001)〉D − |11〉H ⊗ ∣∣G−H(101)〉D ]. (80)
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(Here, as in the general proof, we see that both z1 and z2 must be the same in order for the corresponding
|G−H〉 to be the same.)
As we see here, there is no grouping of |z〉 terms, and so there will be no βx = 0. The Group 1 measurements
are then {1Z(XZ1)′,11(ZXZ)′, Z1(1ZX)′}, and the Group 2 measurements are {XZ(11Z)′, ZX(Z11)′}.
We see that if z1 6= z′1 or z2 6= z′2, the respective states are orthogonal. This implies that 〈ψz|ψz′〉 = 0 ∀z, z′. We
also have ∀x,x′, 〈φx|φx′〉 = 0. From passing the Group 2 measurements, we cannot set any βx = 0 (using the
full stabiliser set, we see that A is the empty set). Then, we simply follow the steps of the general proof to get
|Ψ〉 = UD |G〉. This reasoning holds for any two parties being dishonest, no matter whether they are adjacent,
and so for this case, the parties only need to measure the stabiliser generators.
Four dishonest parties
In this scenario where only one party is honest, the analysis is again simple. Without loss of generality, let
us assume only party 1 is honest, as shown in Figure 3(d). First, let us write the Schmidt decomposition for
this partition (H,D) as
|G〉 = 1√
21
∑
z
|z〉H ⊗ (σ(2)Z σ(5)Z )z1 |G−H〉D
=
1√
2
[
|0〉H ⊗
∣∣G−H(0000)〉D + |1〉H ⊗ ∣∣G−H(1001)〉D ]. (81)
(Note that, as in the general proof, if ⊕
i∈N(d)
zi = z1 is the same, the corresponding |G−H〉 is the same.)
Now, the set of measurements is given by the stabiliser generators again, which we will separate into Group
1 containing {Z(XZ11)′,1(ZXZ1)′,1(1ZXZ)′, Z(11ZX)′}, and Group 2 containing {X(Z11Z)′}. Group 1
passing perfectly gives 〈ψ0|ψ1〉 = 0, since |0〉H , |1〉H will give different outcomes for Z, and so the dishonest
parties must be able to perfectly discriminate between their corresponding parts of the state in order to pass
perfectly (we reach the same conclusion using Equation (13)). Similarly, Group 2 passing perfectly gives
〈φ0|φ1〉 = 0, since |+〉H , |−〉H give different outcomes for X. When there is only one honest party, we cannot
set any βx = 0 from passing perfectly (the set A is the empty set, so this gives the same result as measuring
the full stabiliser set). We then proceed with the proof to get |Ψ〉 = UD |G〉.
Thus, for any number of adjacent dishonest parties, passing the stabiliser generator tests of Protocol 1 allows
us to conclude that the state in each round is |Ψ〉 = UD |G〉. Inserting J = n into Lemmas 1.2 and 1.3 concludes
the proof.
Cycle graph states
With the example of the pentagon graph state in the previous subsection, we notice some features which
can be extended to general n-qubit cycle (or ring) graph states (Figure 4), used in various applications such as
quantum error correction [4] and quantum walks [37]. In Theorem 2C, we give some cases for the cycle graph
state where it suffices to measure only stabiliser generators in Protocol 1. We will outline the reasoning behind
this, although it can be seen explicitly in the pentagon graph state example.
Theorem 2C. If |G〉 is a cycle graph state with either one, n − 2 or n − 1 dishonest parties anywhere in the
network, or any other number of dishonest parties who are adjacent, and we set Ntotal = 2nNtest, Ntest =
dmn4 lnne, and S as the set of stabiliser generators, the probability that the fidelity of the averaged state of the
target copy (over all possible choices of the tested copies and target copy) in Protocol 1 satisfies
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) ≥ 1−
2
√
c
n
− 2n
(
1− Npass
nNtest
)
(82)
is at least 1− n1− 2cm3 , where m, c are positive constants chosen such that 32m < c < (n−1)
2
4 .
Proof sketch. Whenever there are n − 1 or n − 2 dishonest parties in the network, the Schmidt decomposition
is given by
|G〉 = 1√
2|H|
∑
z
|z〉H ⊗
∣∣G−H(z)〉D , (83)
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FIG. 4: 3-qubit, 4-qubit and 6-qubit cycle (ring) graph states.
where each |z〉 corresponds to a different dishonest part |G−H〉. This means that there is no grouping of |z〉
terms, and so the Group 2 measurements do not tell us that any βx = 0, as we saw in the previous example.
Thus, in this case the parties can simply measure the stabiliser generators (the full stabiliser group would give
no additional information, as the set A is empty).
Let us now consider the case of one dishonest party. The dishonest measurements of 1′, corresponding to the
generators of qubits i /∈ N(d), ensure that if xi/∈N(d) = 1, then βx = 0. Further, the two dishonest measurements
of Z ′, corresponding to the generators of the two qubits i ∈ N(d), ensure that if xi∈N(d) are not the same (in
order to give the same honest outcome), then βx = 0. This means that the only terms in the honest subgraph
are
∣∣H(00...00)〉 and ∣∣H(10...01)〉, which allows us to arrive at our result from just the stabiliser generators. (Note
that using the full stabiliser group, Equation (16) would imply that if ⊕
i∈N(d)
xi = 1, or xi/∈N(d) = 1, then βx = 0,
which gives the same result.)
Finally, for any other number of honest/dishonest parties, if the dishonest parties are adjacent then there will
be measurements (1...1)′ in the set of stabiliser generators, corresponding to the generators of honest vertices
that are not connected to any of the dishonest vertices (for qubits i /∈ N(D)). Since the dishonest part must
give outcome +1 for this measurement, the honest part must also give outcome +1 in order to pass perfectly,
any terms where xi/∈N(D) = 1 must have βx = 0. (Note that using the full stabiliser group, the possible sets
A are all combinations of honest vertices that are not connected to any dishonest vertex, which gives the same
result.) Thus, we can conclude that |Ψ〉 = UD |G〉 from only measuring the stabiliser generators.
Inserting J = n into Lemmas 1.2 and 1.3 concludes the proof.
In fact, there are additional examples that do not fall into these categories, but where it suffices to measure
the stabiliser generators only. For example, consider the 6-qubit cycle graph state with D = {2, 3, 6}, the
7-qubit cycle graph state with D = {2, 3, 4, 7}, or the 8-qubit cycle graph state with D = {2, 3, 6, 7}. There are
no βx = 0 in the Schmidt decomposition for these cases, which means that by passing the stabiliser generator
measurements in Protocol 1 perfectly, we can determine that |Ψ〉 = UD |G〉.
Cluster states
Cluster states correspond to lattices of dimension D, and have been shown to be a central resource in MBQC
[1, 38]. For verification of such states in an untrusted network, we will now give some examples of scenarios
where we can reduce the number of test measurements to purely the stabiliser generators (thus allowing the
parties to run the simpler verification scheme in Protocol 1) with a smaller set of test measurements. Again,
these are not the only possible sets of dishonest parties in a cluster state network that allow such a simplification;
there may be many more examples.
Linear, or one-dimensional, cluster states (also known as path graph states) correspond to qubits connected in
a line (Figure 5). In Theorem 2D, we give some cases where it is sufficient to measure the stabiliser generators.
Theorem 2D. If |G〉 is a 1D cluster state with either one or n− 1 dishonest parties anywhere in the network,
or any other number of adjacent honest or dishonest parties, and we set Ntotal = 2nNtest, Ntest = dmn4 lnne,
and S is the set of stabiliser generators, the probability that the fidelity of the averaged state of the target copy
(over all possible choices of the tested copies and target copy) in Protocol 1 satisfies
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) ≥ 1−
2
√
c
n
− 2n
(
1− Npass
nNtest
)
(84)
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FIG. 5: 5-qubit path graph state, or 1D cluster state.
is at least 1− n1− 2cm3 , where m, c are positive constants chosen such that 32m < c < (n−1)
2
4 .
Proof. The stabiliser generators of an n-qubit 1D cluster state are given by {XZ1...1, ZXZ1...1, ...,1...1ZX}.
As we noted for cycle graphs, if there are n − 1 dishonest parties in the network, it suffices to measure only
stabiliser generators, as passing the Group 2 measurements perfectly does not tell us to set any βx = 0.
If there is one dishonest party at either end of the line, we see that to get overall outcome +1, the honest part
of the stabiliser generator measurements corresponding to every honest vertex i /∈ N(d) must give outcome +1.
This means that if xi/∈N(d) = 1, we must have βx = 0. (Note that from the full stabiliser group, we see that all
possible sets A contain only honest vertices i /∈ N(d), and so we come to the same conclusion.) If the dishonest
party is not at the end of the line, but at a vertex connected to two other (honest) vertices, we again must have
that if xi/∈N(d) = 1 then βx = 0, and further, the honest part of the stabiliser generators for i ∈ N(d) must give
the same outcome (as they have the same dishonest part). This means that if xi does not have the same value
for both i ∈ N(d), then βx = 0. (Note that this gives the same result as using the full stabiliser group, as the
set A may consist of any combination of honest vertices i /∈ N(d) as well as both honest vertices i ∈ N(d).)
Further, for any other number of dishonest parties, if it is known that the honest parties are all adjacent
to each other, or the dishonest parties are all adjacent to each other, then the parties could measure only
the stabiliser generators. In such a setting, there will be (1...1)′ measurements in the stabiliser generators
(corresponding to i /∈ N(D)) that allow us to set βx = 0 if xi/∈N(D) = 1. (Note that from the full stabiliser
group, all possible sets A will consist of i /∈ N(D), and so this gives the same result.) This corresponds to
the first |H| qubits of the line belonging to the honest parties, and the remaining |D| qubits belonging to the
dishonest parties (or vice versa).
Inserting J = n into Lemmas 1.2 and 1.3 concludes the proof.
Additional examples of path graph states where it is sufficient to measure only the stabiliser generators
include, for the 5-qubit path graph, the sets D = {1, 2, 5}, or D = {1, 3, 5}, where there are no βx = 0 in the
Schmidt decomposition, and so measuring the stabiliser generators suffices.
Two-dimensional cluster states have the underlying structure of a t× t square grid, where the total number of
qubits in the lattice is n = t× t. In Theorem 2E, we give certain sets of dishonest parties for which it is possible
to verify such states with the resource-efficient Protocol 1 requiring only generator tests. This is a useful result
for verification in the MBQC paradigm.
Theorem 2E. If |G〉 is a 2D cluster state with either one or n− 1 dishonest parties anywhere in the network,
or any other set of adjacent dishonest parties that forms a square or rectangle anywhere in the network, and
we set Ntotal = 2nNtest, Ntest = dmn4 lnne, and S as the set of stabiliser generators, the probability that the
fidelity of the averaged state of the target copy (over all possible choices of the tested copies and target copy) in
Protocol 1 satisfies
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) ≥ 1−
2
√
c
n
− 2n
(
1− Npass
nNtest
)
(85)
is at least 1− n1− 2cm3 , where m, c are positive constants chosen such that 32m < c < (n−1)
2
4 .
Proof. Similarly to what we have seen in previous examples, if there is one honest party, or one dishonest party,
it is enough to measure only the stabiliser generators. We will now show that, for any number of dishonest
parties in a 2D cluster state, if they form a square or rectangle in the lattice, it is possible to do the verification
using only the generators.
Consider the example of a 4× 4 (or 16-qubit) cluster state, with example sets of honest and dishonest parties
as shown in Figure 6. Let us start with the parties 1, 2 and 3 being dishonest, while the remaining are honest,
as in Figure 6(a). If we write down the set of stabiliser generators, we find that the generators corresponding
to qubits 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15 and 16 will have dishonest part (111)′, as they are not connected to the
dishonest set. This means that the corresponding honest measurements on the state |Ψ〉 must give outcome
+1. Recall that the generator of qubit i contains the measurement Xi, which tells us that if xi = 1 for
i ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16} (or equivalently, if xi/∈N(D) = 1), then βx = 0. Further, the dishonest part of the
measurement will be the same for generators of qubits 4 and 14 (since they are both connected to dishonest
qubit 3). This means that in order to pass these test measurements, the corresponding honest part of the
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FIG. 6: Sets of honest (H) and dishonest (D) parties for the 4× 4 cluster state considered in Theorem 2E.
measurements must give the same outcome, and so we must have that if x4 6= x14, then βx = 0. (Note that
from the full stabiliser group, we have all possible sets A containing i /∈ N(D) as well as both i = 4, 14 which
are evenly connected to all d ∈ D. This gives the same conclusions as previously, and so it is clear that only
measuring the generators is necessary.)
Now, consider the example shown in Figure 6(b), where parties 2, 13, 16 and 9 are dishonest, while the
remaining are honest. Again, writing down the set of stabiliser generators, we find that the generators corre-
sponding to qubits 4, 5, 6 and 7 have dishonest part (1111)′, which tells us that if xi = 1 for i ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}, then
βx = 0. Further, the generators of qubits 1 and 3, 12 and 14, 11 and 15, and 8 and 10 have the same dishonest
part, and so we must have that if either x1 6= x3, x12 6= x14, x11 6= x15, or x8 6= x10, then βx = 0. (Note that
from the full stabiliser group, the set A consists of all combinations of i /∈ N(D), as well as combinations of
the pairs of vertices (1, 3), (12, 14), (11, 15), (8, 10) which are evenly connected to all d ∈ D, leading to the same
result.)
Let us now move on to the example shown in Figure 6(c), where parties 13, 14, 15 and 16 are dishonest, and
the remaining are honest. The generators of qubits 1, 4, 7 and 10 have dishonest part (1111)′, which means
that if xi = 1 for i ∈ {1, 4, 7, 10}, then βx = 0. Further, the generators of qubits 1 and 12, 9 and 11, 3 and 5,
and 6 and 8 have the same dishonest part, which means that additionally, if either x1 6= x12, x9 6= x11, x3 6= x5,
or x6 6= x8, then βx = 0. (Note that from the full stabiliser group, we come to the same conclusions, as the set
A contains all combinations of i /∈ N(D) as well as the pairs (1, 12), (9, 11), (3, 5), (6, 8).)
As another example, consider the dishonest set to comprise of parties 8, 9, 10, 11, 15 and 16, as shown in Figure
6(d). From the generators whose dishonest part is (1...1)′, we must have that if xi = 1 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, then
βx = 0. Further, from the generators whose dishonest part is the same, we have that if x6 6= x14, then βx = 0.
(Note that from the full stabiliser group, we see that the set A can contain all combinations of i /∈ N(D) along
with the pair (6, 14).)
Such an analysis easily extends to all cases where the dishonest parties lie in a square or rectangular section of
the lattice; for example, where D = {8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16}, or D = {5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16}.
We finish the proof by invoking Lemmas 1.2 and 1.3, taking J = n.
Note that there are many other sets of dishonest parties for the 2D cluster state for which passing only
the stabiliser generator measurements perfectly implies |Ψ〉 = UD |G〉; as before, here we are only giving some
examples of cases where such a simplification is allowed.
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APPENDIX III: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In Protocol 2, we outlined a symmetric protocol for verification of any graph state with a randomly chosen
party playing the role of the Verifier. We will now prove its security in the following Theorem.
Theorem 3. If we set Ntotal = (λ + 1)λJNtest and Ntest = dmJ4 ln Je, the probability that the fidelity of the
averaged state of the target copy (over all possible choices of the tested copies and target copy) in Protocol 2
satisfies
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) ≥ 1−
( 1
λ
− 1
λ2
)
−
(
1 +
1
λ
)[√c
J
+ λJ− Npass
Ntest
]
(86)
is at least
[
1−∑λx=0 (1− |H|n )x( |H|n J− 2cm3 )λ−x]J, where m, c are positive constants chosen such that the fidelity
and probability expressions are greater than zero.
Proof. Recall that by Serfling’s bound, we have
Pr
[∑
t∈Π
Yt ≤ LR
∑
t∈Π
Yt + Lν
]
≥ 1− exp [− 2ν2LR2
(L+R)(R+ 1)
]
. (87)
In step 2 of Protocol 2, each Sj is tested in λ sets of Ntest copies, with a Verifier chosen at random for each set
of Ntest copies. Now consider the case where we measure the l
th set of Ntest copies for the stabiliser Sj . This
corresponds to taking L = Ntotal− [(j− 1)λ+ l]Ntest and R = Ntest. Let Π(j,l) be the lth set of copies on which
each Sj is measured, and Π
(j,l)
be the set of remaining copies after measuring. Applying Serfling’s bound and
assuming an honest Verifier, we get
Pr
[ ∑
t∈Π(j,l)
Yt ≤ Ntotal − [(j − 1)λ+ l]Ntest
Ntest
∑
t∈Π(j,l)
Yt +
(
Ntotal − [(j − 1)λ+ l]Ntest
)
ν
]
≥ qlj . (88)
The number of remaining copies after all tests is N = Ntotal − λJNtest = λ2JNtest. To bound k, which is
the number of ‘good’ copies in the remaining, we must determine the number of ‘bad’ copies for each stabiliser
measurement Sj . Recall that for each λNtest copies that we test with stabiliser Sj , the CRS randomly chooses
a different Verifier to test each set of Ntest copies.
Let us now assume that for each stabiliser test Sj , at least one Verifier (out of λ) is honest, meaning that
λ − 1 Verifiers are dishonest. For the (λ − 1)Ntest copies tested by a dishonest Verifier, we cannot conclude
anything from our test, since the Verifier can let any state could pass the test. So, for all Sj copies, we have a
total of (λ− 1)JNtest copies that we will have to assume are bad. This means that we can lower bound k by
k ≥ (Ntotal − λJNtest)− (λ− 1)JNtest −
J∑
j=1
[Ntotal − [(j − 1)λ]Ntest
Ntest
∑
t∈Π(j,l)
Yt +
(
Ntotal − [(j − 1)λ]Ntest
)
ν
]
= Ntotal − (2λ− 1)JNtest −
J∑
j=1
[Ntotal − [(j − 1)λ]Ntest
Ntest
∑
t∈Π(j,l)
Yt +
(
Ntotal − [(j − 1)λ]Ntest
)
ν
]
= [(λ2 + λ)− (2λ− 1)]JNtest −
J∑
j=1
Ntotal
Ntest
∑
t∈Π(j,l)
Yt +
J∑
j=1
[(j − 1)λ]Ntest
Ntest
∑
t∈Π(j,l)
Yt −
J∑
j=1
Ntotalν +
J∑
j=1
[(j − 1)λ]Ntestν
≥ (λ2 − λ+ 1)JNtest − Ntotal
Ntest
J∑
j=1
∑
t∈Π(j,l)
Yt −
J∑
j=1
Ntotalν
= (λ2 − λ+ 1)JNtest − Ntotal
Ntest
(
λJNtest −Npass
)− JNtotalν
= (λ2 − λ+ 1)JNtest − (λ2 + λ)J(λJNtest −Npass)− (λ2 + λ)J2νNtest
=
[
(λ2 − λ+ 1)J− (λ2 + λ)λJ2 + (λ2 + λ)JNpass
Ntest
− (λ2 + λ)J2ν
]
Ntest, (89)
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which gives the fraction of ‘good’ remaining copies as
k
N
≥
[
(λ2 − λ+ 1)J− (λ2 + λ)λJ2 + (λ2 + λ)JNpassNtest − (λ2 + λ)J2ν
]
Ntest
λ2JNtest
= 1−
( 1
λ
− 1
λ2
)
−
(λ3 + λ2
λ2
)
J +
(
1 +
1
λ
)Npass
Ntest
−
(
1 +
1
λ
)
Jν
= 1−
( 1
λ
− 1
λ2
)
−
(
1 +
1
λ
)[√c
J
+ λJ− Npass
Ntest
]
. (90)
Recall that the fidelity F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) ≥ kN , and so we have
F (ρ
|G〉
H , ρ
avg
H ) ≥ 1−
( 1
λ
− 1
λ2
)
−
(
1 +
1
λ
)[√c
J
+ λJ− Npass
Ntest
]
. (91)
Let us now calculate qlj . We get
qlj = 1− exp
[
− 2ν
2LR2
(L+R)(R+ 1)
]
= 1− exp
[
− 2ν2
(
Ntotal − [(j − 1)λ+ l]Ntest
)
N2test(
Ntotal − [(j − 1)λ+ l]Ntest +Ntest
)
(Ntest + 1)
]
= 1− exp
[
− 2ν2Ntest 1Ntotal−[(j−1)λ+l]Ntest+Ntest
Ntotal−[(j−1)λ+l]Ntest
1
Ntest+1
Ntest
]
= 1− exp
[
− 2ν2Ntest 1
1 + NtestNtotal−[(j−1)λ+l]Ntest
1
1 + 1Ntest
]
= 1− exp
[
− 2ν2Ntest 1
1 + 1λ2J+λJ−λj+λ−l
1
1 + 1Ntest
]
. (92)
Setting j = J, l = λ, we get
qJ = 1− exp
[
− 2ν2Ntest 1
1 + 1λ2J
1
1 + 1Ntest
]
. (93)
Noting that λ ≥ 1, J ≥ 2, Ntest ≥ 1, we get the probability that there are k ‘good’ copies out of the remaining
to be at least
qJ ≥ 1− exp
[
− 2
3
ν2Ntest
]
= 1− J− 2cm3 . (94)
We now calculate the probability that the above occurs, i.e. that for each stabiliser test Sj , one or more of
the Verifiers are honest, and that when they are, the condition on the left-hand side of Equation (88) holds,
leading to Equation (91). For a given Sj , this probability is given by
1−
λ∑
x=0
(
1− |H|
n
)x( |H|
n
)λ−x (
1− qlmaxj
)λ−x
, (95)
where qlmaxj is the maximum of q
l
j over all l. From Equation (92), we see that q
l
j ≥ qJ. Taking this for all Sj ,
we get the probability that Equation (91) holds to be
J∏
j=1
[
1−
λ∑
x=0
(
1− |H|
n
)x( |H|
n
)λ−x (
1− qlmaxj
)λ−x ]
≥
[
1−
λ∑
x=0
(
1− |H|
n
)x( |H|
n
)λ−x
(1− qJ)λ−x
]J
≥
[
1−
λ∑
x=0
(
1− |H|
n
)x( |H|
n
J−
2cm
3
)λ−x ]J
. (96)
